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I.   INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 1999, a three-judge panel of the Trademark Trial and Ap-
peal Board (TTAB) of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) ordered
the cancellation of federal registrations of seven trademarks of the Red-
skins, the National Football League’s (NFL) Washington, D.C., team.1
The marks canceled include the team’s name and the team’s helmet logo.
The TTAB’s decision was based on a finding that the name Redskins is
disparaging to Native Americans. The decision relied on testimony from
linguists and historians that the term “Redskin” is pejorative and on a
survey finding that forty-six percent of the general public finds the term
offensive.2
The TTAB’s 145-page decision does not prevent the Redskins from
using the name and logos, but, arguably, it jeopardizes merchandising
revenue by preventing the team from invoking federal law to prevent un-
authorized goods from using the name and logos. The TTAB’s decision,
however, does not take effect until the Redskins have had a chance to
appeal.3 The Redskins organization has stated that it has no plans to stop
using the team name, and it will likely appeal the decision to the United
                                                                                                                                                
* B.A. Yeshiva University, 1993; J.D., with honors, Columbia University, 1996; COA,
with honors, Parker School of Comparative and International Law, 1996. Clerk, Judge Law-
rence M. Baskir, United States Court of Federal Claims.
1. See  Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (P.T.O 1999).
2. See  id.  at 1732-34.
3. See Brooke A. Masters, Redskins Lose Right to Trademark Protection, WASH. POST ,
Apr. 3, 1999, at A1.
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States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.4 In addition, lawyers for
the team believe that even if the Federal Circuit sustains the decision,
state and common law protection will prevent unauthorized merchan-
dising.5 However, it is possible that the TTAB’s decision will strip the
Redskins’ football’s trademarks not only of federal protection, but also of
common-law trademark protection.6
Part II of this Article analyzes the TTAB’s decision in the historical
context of trademark protection and with respect to decisions concern-
ing “disparaging” or “scandalous” marks. It examines the evidence on
both sides of the dispute and addresses the potential effect of cancella-
tion on use of the Redskins’ mark, both for the Redskins and for other
potentially affected teams. For example, the Florida State University
(FSU) Seminoles, named after the Native American Seminole tribe, have
been the subject of recent controversy at FSU.7 Professor Fred Stanley,
chairman of the English Department, recently called for FSU to change
the name of its sport teams.8 The TTAB’s recent cancellation decision
might further escalate the debate.
Part III discusses other remedies potentially available to Native
Americans to limit the misappropriation of Native American names and
Native American culture, should the Federal Circuit overturn the TTAB’s
decision. The Native American challenge against the Redskins registra-
tion is an issue of first impression,9 and if it fails, Native American
groups may wish to find other legal remedies to confront the issue of so-
cial mischaracterization. While such remedies may not successfully pre-
vent use of the Redskins mark, they might succeed in stopping other
teams or businesses from using Indian-related names and marks.
Regardless of whether the TTAB’s decision is upheld on appeal, rep-
resentatives of a wide spectrum of the Native American community init i-
ated the challenge to the trademark’s registration,10 and the resentment
expressed by Native Americans may motivate the owner or future
owner(s) of the Redskins to change the team’s name.11 Part IV of this ar-
ticle discusses trademark concerns in choosing a new name and recom-
mends a new name intended to retain the goodwill vested in the Red-
skins mark. Trademark concerns that are present in choosing a new
                                                                                                                                                
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. At least one case has held that if a mark is not entitled to federal registration because
it does not pass content-based registration bars, the mark cannot receive protection at common
law. See  De Nobili v. Scanda, 198 F. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1912) (ind icating that public policy prevents
marks which can not be registered from receiving common-law protection).
7. See  FSU in Losing Fight over Seminole Name, Prof Says, STUART NEWS, April 16,
1999, at C3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Stunws File.
8. See  id.
9. A registered mark has never been canceled based on 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994); how-
ever, marks have been denied registration based on 1052(a). See  George Likourezos, A Case of
First Impression: American Indians Seek Cancellation of the Trademarked Term “Redskins,”
78  J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 275, 276 (1996).
10. See  Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
11. Similar resentment motivated the Quaker Oats Company to revise the image of “Aunt
Jemima,” which many considered a degrading depiction of an African-American. See  Sandra
Clark & Paul Shepard, Trademark Makeovers Aim to Keep Image Hip, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER ,
Mar. 7, 1993, at E1.
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team name include trademark confusion caused by the name change, re-
verse confusion caused if the new name is too similar to one already in
use, trademark infringement, and ownership of a team name no longer
in use.
If the Redskins choose to change their name as a result of the pending
registration action, they will have familiar precedents to consider. The
Wizards, the National Basketball Association (NBA) team that, like the
Redskins, plays in the Washington, D.C., area, very recently fought and
won a trademark case emanating from its name change.12 Another NFL
team, the Jacksonville Jaguars, also recently confronted the trademark
complications and pitfalls associated with choosing a new name.13 If the
Redskins choose a new name, they will want to ensure preservation of
the exclusive use of their old name. A third NFL team, the Indianapolis
Colts, recently confronted the trademark complications of abandoning
the use of the team’s predecessor name—“Baltimore Colts.”14
Significant developments in trademark law ensued as a result of these
teams’ challenges, illustrating the powerful social and economic value of
prominent trademarks.15 However the current controversy is resolved,
the outcome and subsequent appeal of the TTAB’s decision will have sig-
nificant consequences. Many professional, college, and high-school
teams that use racial or ethnic names may have to re-evaluate the use of
such names in light of potential decreased trademark protection.16 More
                                                                                                                                                
12. See  infra Part IV.C. (discussing the debate about the likelihood of confusion between
the Washington Wizards and the Harlem Wizards).
13. See  infra Part IV.A (discussing the confusion between the Jacksonville Jaguars and
Jaguar Cars, Ltd.).
14. See  John R. O’Neill, NFL Colts Blitzing CFL Colts: NFL Joins Lawsuit Charging
Trademark of Name, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 30, 1994, at B1.
15. In 1992, analysts estimated that the NFL sold approximately $2.1 billion in licensed
merchandise. See  Calvin Sims, It’s Not Just How Well You Play the Game, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
1993, sec. 3, at 5. National Football League Properties, Inc. (NFLP) is a California corporation
owned by NFL teams, which acts as the exclusive licensing agent for team trademarks. The
NFLP issues manufacturing licenses for a royalty fee of six to eight percent of all wholesale
revenue from licensed product sales. See  Gerald Eskenazi, Sports Logos Now Symbols of Big
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1989, at A1.
The significant value of a football team’s trademarks is evident from the many suits brought
to protect team’s and the NFL’s exclusive right to use certain marks. See, e.g. , Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that the use of
the team’s cheerleader outfit in the movie Debbie Does Dallas caused confusion and violated
team’s trademark rights); Nat’l Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear,
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 659-60 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (finding that unauthorized jerseys infringed
on trademark rights by causing consumer confusion as to who produced and sponsored the
goods); Nat’l Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enter., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 242, 246
(Ill. Ct. App. 1975) (following Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510
F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), and finding that teams had property rights in team symbols as a re-
sult of acquiring goodwill and secondary mean ing, which, therefore, prevented an unau thorized
company from selling patches of team symbols).
16. In addition to the Washington Redskins, a small sampling of teams that use Native
American Indian names include: the Atlanta Braves, the Cleveland Indians, the Kansas City
Chiefs, and the Florida State University Seminoles. Some teams stopped using these names a f-
ter receiving complaints that they were offensive. In 1972, Stanford University changed its
name from the Indians to the Cardinals, and the University of Massachusetts changed its mas-
cot from the Indian to the Minuteman. See  David Arnold, Minutemen Comes Under ‘90s-Style
Fire, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 14, 1993, at 1; see  also  Karen Goldberg, Ethnic Team Names Draw
New Attacks, WASH. TIMES , July 10, 1993, at D1. In 1974, Dartmouth also stopped using “Indi-
ans” as a team name. See  Review & Outlook: Do You Wahoo?, WALL ST. J., April 23, 1999,
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broadly, the registration challenge and its outcome will help define the
role of trademark registration as either a commercial tool, a social
monitor, or an amalgamation of both.
II.   THE PETITION FOR CANCELLATION
On September 10, 1992 a delegation of Native Americans (Delega-
tion) filed a Petition for Cancellation with the PTO to cancel the federal
registration of the Washington Redskins trademark, and related trade-
marks.17 Pro Football, Inc. (Pro Football) is the owner of the trademarks
at issue. The Delegation represented a wide spectrum of the Native
American community.18 The petition alleged that the term “Redskins” is
a “pejorative, derogatory, degrading, offensive, scandalous, contemptu-
ous, disreputable, disparaging and racist designation for a Native Ameri-
can person” and therefore violated 15 U.S.C. section 1052(a). 19 The chal-
lenge reflected the Native American activists’ concern that Indian-
related names, logos, mascots, paraphernalia, and related fan activity
perpetuate racist stereotypes of Native Americans as wild savages and
preserve the image that Native Americans are relics of the past.20 Native
Americans have long asserted that the Redskins trademark is particu-
larly derogatory, because, unlike some of the other names ostensibly
based on Native American culture, it is an actual racial epithet.21
                                                                                                                                                
available in 1999 WL-WSJ 5449799. In 1994, St. Johns decided to change its team’s name from
the “Redmen” to the “Red Storm.” Michael Shain, Launder St. Johns’ Tradition “Redmen” May
be Ousted, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 4, 1993, at 172. In 1991, St. Johns removed its logo depicting an
Indian brave. Despite the Indian logo, the school claimed that the name Redmen emanated
from the red jerseys the team used to wear, and not from a Native American derivation. See  id.
In addition, the Boards of Education of Wisconsin and Minnesota almost banned all Indian
mascots in public schools. See  Keith Ervin, Debate on Dropping School Mascots, SEATTLE
TIMES , Sept. 22, 1993, at B1.
17. See  Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1829 (P.T.O. 1994). Re-
lated trademarks the petition sought to cancel included: “Redskinettes,” “Skins,” “Redskins,”
“The Redskins & Design,” and “The Redskins” (with stylized letters).
18. The members of the delegation included Suzan Shown Harjo, the President of the
Morning Star Foundation; Vine Deloria, Jr., Esq., a citizen of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
and Professor of History at the University of Colorado; Norbert S. Hill, Jr., Esq., a member of
the Oneida Tribe of Wisconsin and Executive Director of the American Indian Science and En-
gineering Society; Manley A. Begay, Jr., of the Navajo Nation; Mateo Romero, member of the
Cochiti Pueblo; William A. Means, a member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe; and Raymond D. Apo-
daca, Governor of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, and Area Vice President and Chairman of the Hu-
man and Religious Rights Committee of the National Congress of American Indians. See
George Likourezos, A Case of First Impression: American Indians Seek Cancellation of the
Trademarked Term “Redskins,” 78  J. PAT. & T RADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 275, 276-77 (Apr. 1996).
19. Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
20. See  Don Pierson, Redskins Nickname Will Be Protest Target, CHI . TRIB., Jan. 19,
1992, at 2C.
21. Activism related to the issue of Native American mascots and names has been ongoing
for approximately twenty-four years. See Clarence Page, Block that Trademarked Racial Ep i-
thet, ORLANDO SENT., Sept. 23, 1992, at A9. Prior to the recent trademark action, two of the
most notable Native American protests to team names occurred: one held during the 1992 Su-
per Bowl, featuring the Redskins; the other held during the 1991 World Series, featuring the
Atlanta Braves. Protests organized by the American Indian Movement drew nearly three thou-
sand activists to the Super Bowl. See  Raad Cawthon, Indians Receive Sympathy but No Prom-
ises from Braves , ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 22, 1991, at H8; see  also Mike Freeman, NFL Deadline
For Plan B Slips to Mar. 1, NFLPA Says Move Is Political, WASH. POST , Jan. 25, 1992, at D7.
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On March 11, 1994, the TTAB ruled on the delegation’s motion to
strike certain of the Redskins’ affirmative defenses; two have survived.
This ruling has set the stage for the full TTAB trial between the parties,
and the resulting TTAB decision.
A.   Trademark Protection
Common law, state registration, and federal registration can protect
trademarks. Common law protection arises from the simple adoption
and use of an identifying mark, even absent any form of registration, and
creates an enforceable right of exclusivity in the mark’s geographic area
of use.22
Trademark legislation dates back to 1791 when Thomas Jefferson
proposed keeping a record of the name used on an item and making it
illegal for others to put such name on their goods.23 In 1870 Congress
enacted the first federal trademark statute, which the Supreme Court
found unconstitutional in 1879. 24 In 1881 and 1905 Congress tried again
with limited trademark statutes.25
In 1946 Congress passed the Lanham Act, 26 which provides for a fed-
eral registration system to protect trademarks used in commerce. 27 The
term “trademark” includes any “word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof” used by an individual to identify and distinguish
his goods, or indicate a specific source of such goods, even if the source
is unknown. 28 The purpose of federal trademark registration and protec-
tion is to protect the trademark owner’s exclusive right to profit from the
goodwill, which he has invested in his mark, and to protect the public
from confusion regarding products and product sources.29
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) governs trademark registra-
tion. The PTO’s role is to promote the progress of scientific and artistic
progress by securing authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their
respective writings and discoveries for a limited duration of time.30 The
PTO is a non-commercial federal entity and one of fourteen bureaus in
the Department of Commerce (DOC). 31 The PTO’s major functions are
the examination and issuance of patents and the examination and regis-
tration of trademarks.32 Trademark registration assists businesses in
                                                                                                                                                
22. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916); Avakoff v. Southern
Pac. Co., 765 F.2d 1097, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
23. Beverly W. Pattishall, The Constitutional Foundations of American Trademark Law,
78 TRADEMARK REP . 456, 459 (1988).
24. See  id . at 460; see  also United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
25. See  Pattishall, supra note 23, at 461-62.
26. See  Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
27. See id.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
29. See  Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Founders’ Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 115 F.
Supp. 787, 791 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
30. See  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
31. Title 15 U.S.C. § 1511 states that the PTO is under the jurisdiction and supervision of
the Department of Commerce. See  15 U.S.C. § 1511 (1994).
32. Title 15 contains the provisions of the Trademark Act of 1946 that govern the admini-
stration of the trademark registration system of the PTO. See  15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 &
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protecting their investments, promoting goods and services, and safe-
guarding consumers against confusion and deception in the market-
place.33
The PTO, however, does not determine rights for trademark usage.34
Specifically, the PTO examines trademarks for potential registration on
the Principal Register. The Principal Register provides numerous forms
of protection to registrants and provides the mark’s owner with signifi-
cant benefits not otherwise granted by common law.35 Registration on
the Principal Register gives constructive notice to all later users of the
trademark or of similar trademarks, which overcomes claims of good
faith use.36 Such constructive notice abrogates the existence of any geo-
graphical limitation on the knowledge and validity of the trademark.37
The registrant obtains certain forms of trademark protection even in
geographically distant areas where the registrant is not using the mark.38
Registration on the Principal Register is accompanied by certain statu-
tory rights, such as a degree of incontestability by others,39 including
prima facie evidence of ownership and validity of the trademark.40 In
addition, federal registration provides trademark owners with access to
federal courts to litigate issues related to the mark.41
The ban on registration of “immoral” and “scandalous” marks first
appeared as part of the 1905 federal trademark statute, which preceded
the Lanham Act,42 and is now incorporated into the Lanham Act at Title
15 of the United States Code.43 The major theories underlying the Lan-
ham Act, section 1052(a), and the prohibition on inappropriate trade-
marks are (1) that the government should not waste its resources on
protecting unseemly marks and (2) that the government should not pro-
                                                                                                                                                
Supp. IV 1998). Title 44 gives the PTO the authority to print patents, trademarks, and other
matters relating to the business of the PTO. See  44 U.S.C. §§ 1337-38 (1994).
33. See  generally The PTO web page (visited Feb. 7, 1996) <www.uspto.gov>.
34. See  Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminum v. Hunter Eng’g Co., 655 F.2d 938, 943
(9th Cir. 1981) (finding that an action for declaratory judgment that a patent is i nvalid or that a
plaintiff is not infringing on a trademark are “case or controversy” justiciable by the courts).
35. Such protections apply to service marks and collective marks as well. See  15 U.S.C. §§
1053-54, 1127 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
36. See  id.  § 1072; see  also Quality Courts United, Inc. v. Quality Courts, Inc., 140 F. Supp.
341, 350 (M.D. Pa. 1956).
37. See  15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1994); see  also  Allied Tel. Co. v. Allied Tel. Sys. Co., 565 F. Supp.
211, 216 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
38. See  15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1994).
39. See  id.  § 1065. Because the PTO is only concerned with registration issues, the PTO’s
analysis will generally only focus on issues of registration, and will gene rally only compare the
information it has immediately before it. This analysis is different from the more extensive
marketplace-oriented analysis undertaken by the courts. See  Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, KOA
is A.O.K.: The Second Circuit’s Recent Kosher Trademark Decision Further Illustrates that the
Patent and Trademark Office Must Answer to a Higher Au thority , 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
203, 211-14 (1998) (arguing that PTO decisions should not have res judicata effect because, as
recent case law demonstrates, PTO determinations sometimes lack a thorough marketplace
analysis).
40. See  15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
41. See  id.  § 1121.
42. See  Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, §§ 1-3, 33 Stat. 724 (1905) (previous version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 81-109) (repealed 1946).
43. See  15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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vide its imprimatur to unseemly marks.44 While section 1052(a) bars
only the registration of scandalous, disparaging, or immoral marks, and
not the use thereof, it does deny statutory protection and benefits re-
sulting from registration.
B.   Framing the Case and Controversy
In Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., a delegation of Native Americans filed
a Petition for Cancellation of the “Redskins” trademark.45 The Petitioners
asserted as grounds for cancellation that the mark is “pejorative, de-
rogatory, degrading, offensive, scandalous, contemptuous, disreputable,
disparaging and racist.”46 Section 1052(a) states that a mark is to be re-
fused registration if it “consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” 47
Pro Football, owner of the Redskins trademark, raised a number of
affirmative defenses to the Delegation’s cancellation action, including: 1)
lack of standing; 2) equitable estoppel; 3) laches 4) secondary meaning
of mark; 5) lack of damage to Petitioner; 6) that section 1052(a) of the
Lanham Act is unconstitutional because it burdens free speech; 7) that
section 1052(a) of the Lanham Act is unconstitutional because it is
overly broad; 8) that section 1052(a) of the Lanham Act is unconstitu-
tional because it is vague; and 9) that the Redskins mark does not dis-
parage Petitioner because it is not reasonably understood to refer to Pe-
titioner, or any Native American group.48
The Delegation responded, motioning the court to strike certain of
Pro Football’s defenses. The Delegation brought its motion to strike in
early 1994, and the TTAB ruled on the motion on March 11, 1994. The
TTAB stated that in order to have standing, a petitioner must have a per-
sonal interest in the outcome of a proceeding.49 The TTAB found that the
Native American delegation had standing, because they had demon-
strated a belief that the term was disparaging as applied to Native
Americans.50 Additionally, the TTAB dismissed Pro Football’s laches and
equitable estoppel defenses, finding that an overriding public interest
trumped the failure to challenge the mark over the many years since its
registration.51
The TTAB did not address the constitutional defenses raised by Pro
Football, ruling instead that such defenses were outside the scope of the
                                                                                                                                                
44. See  In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981); see also Lee v. Superior Court,
11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (1992) (denying petition for name change to “Misteri Nigger” because it
refused to sanction a racial epithet).
45. See  Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1829 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
46. See  id.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
48. See  Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829-30.
49. See  Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(holding that if a person does not plead facts sufficient to show a personal interest in the out-
come of the case beyond that of the general public, the case may be dismissed for failure to state
a claim).
50. See  Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830.
51. See  id . at 1831.
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TTAB’s authority.52 The TTAB further concluded that since it is an ad-
ministrative agency empowered by Congress, it does not have the
authority to determine if Congressional enactments are constitutional.53
Petitioners may, however, raise constitutional defenses on appeal.54
                                                                                                                                                
52. See  id . at 1833.
53. See  id . For further discussion of the constitutionality of 1052(a) and limiting speech,
see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture:
Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. R EV. 1258, 1262-75 (1992).
See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (noting that the bedrock principle under-
lying the First Amendment is that government cannot prohibit expression of an idea simply be-
cause society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable); Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F.
Supp. 1227, 1245-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding legislation prohibiting the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms from certifying a label that uses the name “Crazy Horse” on alcohol an un -
constitutional prohibition on commercial speech); Sambo’s of Ohio v. City Council of City of
Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177, 180 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (holding that restricting use of term “Sambo’s”
would violate First Amendment); Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the
Doctrine of Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP . L. REV.
7, 43 (1994) [hereinafter, Politically Correct]; Jendi B. Reiter, Redskins and Scarlet Letters:
Why “Immoral” and “Scandalous” Trademarks Should be Federally Registrable, 6 FED. CIR .
B.J. 191, 196 (Fall 1996), (argu ing that 1052(a) unconstitutionally encroaches on free speech).
But see  In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (finding that § 1052(a) is not an un -
constitu tional restriction on free speech because registration is not determinative of usage
rights); Bruce C. Kelber, “Scalping the Redskins:” Can Trademark Law Start Athletic Teams
Bearing Native American Nicknames and Images on the Road to Racial Reform?, 17 H AMLINE
L. R EV. 533, 562 (1994); and Paul E. Loving, Native American Team Names in Athletics: It’s
Time to Trade These Marks, 13 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J.  1, 34-35 (1992) (concluding that § 1052(a) is
a constitutional and effective tool to advance social goals).
Because a trademark is commercial speech, trademark legislation is subjected to relaxed Con-
stitutional requirements. See  Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1979). Government regu -
lation of commercial speech must serve a substantial purpose and not be broader than is neces-
sary to serve such purpose. See  Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571-72 (1980); see also Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They
Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 288-91 (1990) (examining the government’s role
in regulating speech in a democratic society); Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the
Gay Olympics Case, 79 TRADEMARK REP . 604, 617 (1989) (discussing the need to balance free
speech with trademark concerns); Caren Schmulen Sweetland, The Demise of a Workable
Commercial Speech Doctrine: Dangers of Extending First Amendment Protection to Commer-
cial Disclosure Requirements, 76 TEX L. REV. 471, 483 (1997) (arguing that failure to distin -
guish between commercial speech and more protected political speech dilutes First Amend-
ment protection).
Regardless of whether § 1052(a) is constitutional, it presents serious efficiency problems.
What is, or is not, an offensive term is a question open to significant difference of opinion, and
may force the PTO and courts to make determinations which are beyond the proper scope of
trademark protection and which may not be purely objective. The value of a trademark is in the
goodwill that accrues to the mark and the associations consumers make with the mark. The
marketplace might be a more objective arbiter of what is and is not an offensive mark.
54. A party dissatisfied with a PTO decision has the option to appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit or to appeal through a civil action in federal district court. The ap -
peal is governed by section 21 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1071, and TRADEMARK MODEL
RULES OF PRACTICE Rule 2.145. On appeal, a district court can provide greater relief, and give
less weight to the fact-findings of the PTO, than does the Federal Circuit. See  Lanham Act § 21,
15 U.S.C. § 1071 (1994); see also TRADEMARK MODEL RULES OF PRACTICE Rule 2.145. An appeal
that takes the form of a civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with a district
court, and is governed by FED. R. C IV. P. 3. See  U.S. D EPT. OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADE
OFFICE , TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE § 903.04 (1995). The
complaint indicates the unsuccessful party in the PTO as the plaintiff and the winning party as
the defendant, and it bases federal juri sdiction on the Lanham Act § 21(b) and 15 U.S.C. § 1071.
An appeal to a district court can be expanded to include a prayer for injunctive relief for trade-
mark infringement. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Stagecoach Prop ., Inc., 685 F.2d 302 (9th Cir
1982); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday out in America, 481 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that
an appeal to the district court is a trial de novo, although the facts determined by the board are
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Two of Pro Football’s defenses remained after the TTAB’s initial de-
termination, including a “secondary meaning” defense. Both defenses
essentially argued that the Redskins mark does not disparage Native
Americans and the mark is not reasonably understood to refer to any
particular Native American group.55 Pro Football’s secondary meaning
defense is that through long, substantial and widespread use, the Red-
skins mark has acquired a secondary meaning—the term is associated
with a professional football team, rather than with Native Americans.56
The TTAB’s decision slated the dispute for trial. It indicated that the
case would be determined by deciding whether, at the time the registra-
tion was issued, the mark was scandalous or disparaging.57 Because a
federally registered trademark has a presumption of validity, the Dele-
gation had the burden of proving disparagement.58
C.   “Disparaging” and “Scandalous”
1.   “Disparaging” Standard and Case Law
To prevail in its action against the Redskins the Delegation had to
prove that the mark “Redskins”, as applied to Native Americans, was ei-
ther disparaging or scandalous at the time the mark was registered.59 In
determining the standard to apply, the TTAB surprisingly rejected the
application of an earlier decision. 60 The TTAB distinguished, in part, the
test established in Grey hound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc. for deter-
mining whether a mark was “disparaging.”61 In Greyhound, the Board
stated that in order to be found disparaging, a mark must (1) be rea-
sonably understood to refer to the plaintiff; and (2) be considered offen-
sive or objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.62
The TTAB stated that the reasonable person standard applies when the
issue is disparagement of a commercial corporate entity or an individ-
ual.63
In rejecting the Greyhound standard, the TTAB noted the distinction
between commercial and non-commercial entities and between indi-
                                                                                                                                                
controlling). The appeal also allows for counterclaims for federal or common-law claims. See
Johnson & Johnson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 345 F. Supp. 1216 (D.N.J. 1972) (allowing the
defendant to file a compulsory counterclaim pursuant to FED R. CIV. P. 13(a)). Thus, in going to
a federal district court rather than to the Federal Circuit, the appellant incurs the risk of the ad -
verse party expanding the scope of the litigation beyond the mere appeal from the TTAB’s deci-
sion. See  3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21:20
(3d ed. 1992).
55. See  Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
56. See  id.  This is different from the typical “secondary meaning” defense, which argues
that the average consumer associates a trademark with a particular source for the product. See
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT , PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES  247 (1993).
57. See  Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
58. See  id . at 1829-30.
59. See  id.
60. See  Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (T.T.A.B. 1988)
(using a “substantial composite of the general public” test to find a mark which depicts a defe-
cating dog scandalous).
61. See  Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1739-40 (P.T.O. 999).
62. See  Greyhound, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639.
63. See  Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738.
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viduals and groups, in cases involving alleged disparagement.64 In cases
involving non-commercial entities or groups, it found the test enunci-
ated in In re Hines to be more “appropriate.” 65 In Hines, the TTAB noted
that the determination of disparagement for a targeted, distinct religious
group was “highly subjective,” and thus, the perceptions of the public
were irrelevant and “only the perceptions of those referred to, identified
or implicated in some recognizable manner by the involved mark are
relevant to this determination.”66 Applying this rationale to the case at
hand, it determined that the standard when dealing with alleged dispar-
agement of a religious or racial group is the view of the distinct group to
whom the mark refers, identifies or implicates.67
Therefore, the Delegation had to show that “Redskins” can be rea-
sonably understood to refer to Native Americans and that the term
“Redskins” is offensive or objectionable from a Native American’s view-
point. To determine if the Delegation had met its burden, the TTAB ex-
amined “evidence often considered in the decisional law concerning
scandalousness and disparagement,” such as dictionary definitions, his-
tory, linguistic analysis and evidence from various contemporary secon-
dary sources.68 Based on the “cumulative effect of the entire record” the
TTAB found the “disparaging connotation of ‘redskin(s)’. . . extend[s] to
the word ‘Redskin(s)’ as it appear[ed] in [the] subject marks and as used
in connection with respondent’s identified services.” 69 Further, since this
was an opposition proceeding and not an ex parte determination, the
Redskins did not enjoy the presumptions in favor of registration dis-
cussed in In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd. 70 Following Hines and
Mavety, the TTAB determined that “Redskins” was disparaging to Na-
tive Americans from the viewpoint of a substantial composite of Native
Americans.71
Even with the guidelines of Hines and Mavety, however, the outcome
of the registration challenge was highly speculative. Past decisions indi-
cated that determinations regarding disparagement were unpredict-
able.72 The first case to refuse trademark registration on the grounds that
the mark was disparaging is Doughboy Industries, Inc. v. Reese Chemi-
cal Co.73
                                                                                                                                                
64. See  id.
65. Id.; see  also In re Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (P.T.O. 1994).
66. Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688-89.
67. See  Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
68. Id. at 1744.
69. Id. at 1743.
70. 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In Mavety, the Federal Circuit Court dealt with an
appeal of a refusal to register a mark based on the grounds that the mark was scandalous, not
disparaging, but its analysis may still be helpful for implementing the “disparaging” test since
similar evidence is often proffered to support both claims. See  di scussion infra Part II.C.2.; see
also Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743-44.
71. See  Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743-44.
72. See, e.g., Doughboy Industries, Inc. v. Reese Chem. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227
(P.T.O. 1951); In re Reemtsma Cigarettenbabriken, 122 U.S.P.Q. 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959); In re
Waughtel, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 594, (T.T.A.B. 1963); In re Condas, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 544
(T.T.A.B. 1975); In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
73. See  Doughboy, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 228; see  also Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1738-39 (noting the au thority of Doughboy).
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In Doughboy, the PTO held that the use of the mark “Dough-Boy” for
a prophylactic device for preventing venereal disease was disparaging to
American veterans who had served in World War I, and had been re-
ferred to as doughboys. The PTO focused on the product to which the
mark applied.74 The TTAB, likewise, focused on the product to which the
mark applied in In re Reemtsma Cigarettenbabriken.75 In Reemtsma ,
the TTAB denied registration to the mark “Senussi” for cigarettes, be-
cause it found that application of the mark disparaged members of the
Senussi faith, whose religion forbids smoking. 76 In In re Condas, the
TTAB pe rmitted the registration of the mark “Jap” for women’s clothing,
finding that the use of the mark did not disparage Japanese.77 In In re In
Over Our Heads, Inc., the Board found the mark “MOONIES” did not
disparage members of the Unification Church, because it would not be
associated with members of the Unification Church as applied to a nov-
elty item, which, at the press of a button, dropped its pants and revealed
its buttocks.78
However, at least one decision might have shown which way the wind
was blowing. An arguable precursor to the TTAB’s decision in Harjo was
an August 1995 PTO decision which refused to register the mark “Crazy
Horse” as applied to a malt liquor, finding it violated Section 1052(a).79
2.   “Scandalous” Standard and Case Law
The Harjo delegation also challenged the Redskins trademark on the
grounds that it is “scandalous.” The general definition for “scandalous” is
“shocking to one’s sense of decency or propriety” and “offensive to the
conscience or moral feeling.”80 To determine whether a mark is scandal-
ous, the mark is considered as applied to the goods identified in the reg-
istration.81 In In re McGinley, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
held that whether a mark is scandalous or immoral is to be ascertained
from the standpoint of a substantial composite of the general public.82 In
                                                                                                                                                
74. See  Doughboy, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1739.
75. See  Reemtsma, 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339; see  also Harjo, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739
(noting the authority of Reemtsma).
76. See  In re Waughtel, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 594, 595 (T.T.A.B. 1963) (holding mark
“Amish” for cigars did not disparage the Amish, because Amish are not prohibited from smok-
ing).
77. See  Condas, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 544.
78. See  In re In Over Our Heads, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990); Harjo, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736 (noting the authority of Over Our Heads).
79. See  Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse ,
27 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1028-29 (1995).
80. In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (finding that the mark “Ma-
donna” was scandalous as applied to wines). See  also  In re P.J. Valckenberg, 122 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 334 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (denying mark twenty years later). But see  Federal Trademark Reg-
istration Number 1,473,554 (1988) (allowing registration of “Madonna” as stage name for a pop
singer).
81. See  In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (finding “Big Pecker” was
not a scandalous mark because a substantial composite of the general public would not neces-
sarily associate the term with a man’s genitalia instead of a bird’s beak). The TTAB noted Her-
shey’s authority in the PTO Final Decision. See  Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.Q.2d (BNA)
1705, 1736 (P.T.O. 1999).
82. See  660 F.2d at 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that a photograph of a nude man and a
woman kissing with the man’s genitalia exposed is scandalous and immoral from the stand -
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determining whether the term Redskins was scandalous, the TTAB also
looked to a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, In re Mavety Media Group Ltd. ,83 which interpreted section
1052(a)’s prohibition on the registration of scandalous marks.84 In
Mavety, the court vacated and remanded a decision by the TTAB on the
grounds that the TTAB did not have actual evidence that a substantial
composite of the general public would find the mark “Black Tail,” as ap-
plied to an adult magazine featuring African-American women, scandal-
ous.85
The Federal Circuit in Mavety, concluded that the test for scandal-
ousness is based upon an underlying factual inquiry, which is to be de-
termined from the viewpoint of a substantial composite of the general
public and in the context of contemporary attitudes.86 The Mavety court
accepted dictionary definitions and editorials as authoritative but not
definitive, since the court ultimately concluded that dictionaries do not
necessarily represent the views of a substantial composite of the general
public.87 The court concluded that questions as to whether a mark is
scandalous should be resolved in favor of the applicant, because an op-
position proceeding can be brought after the mark is published by those
who find the mark to be scandalous, thus establishing a greater record
for determining whether the mark truly is scandalous. 88 The TTAB fur-
ther noted the authority of In re Old Glory Condom Corp., which held
that an American flag design on condoms is not scandalous.89
Based on this case law, to assess whether the mark Redskins is scan-
dalous, the TTAB needed to determine whether the term “Redskins,” as
applied to a football team, is shocking to a substantial composite of the
general public’s sense of decency or propriety. Furthermore, the TTAB
needed to find “Redskins” offensive to a substantial composite of the
                                                                                                                                                
point of a substantial composite of the general public). See  Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735-
36 (noting the authority of McGinley); see also  In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863,
866 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (finding that use of the mark “bullshit” for accessories was scandalous); In
re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 443-44 (T.T.A.B. 1971) (denying the mark “Bubby Trap”
registration as applied to brassieres); Ex Parte  Summit Brass & Bronze Works, Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 22, 23 (Comr. 1943) (refusing registration for mark “Agnus Dei” as applied to safes,
finding that such application of an emblem sacred to the Christian faith would be offensive and
scandalous); Ex parte Martha Maid Mfg., 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156, 156 (1938) (denying the mark
“Queen Mary” for women’s underwear was denied registration because it was found to be scan -
dalous).
83. 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
84. See  id.  at 1370.
85. See  id.  at 1375.
86. See  id . at 1371.
87. See  id . at 1373.
88. See  id . at 1374.
89. See In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1220-21 (T.T.A.B.
1993); see also In re In over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653, 1655 (T.T.A.B. 1990)
(finding the mark “MOONIES” not scandalous as applied to a novelty item which dropped its
pants and revealed its buttocks);  In re Leo Quan, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 370, 371 (T.T.A.B.
1978) (finding that “Badass,” standing for Benticourt Acoustically Designed Audio Sound Sys-
tems is not scandalous or immoral); In re Thomas Labs, Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 50, 52
(T.T.A.B. 1975) (finding a cartoon of a melancholy man examining his unseen genitalia was not
shocking to society’s sense of propriety); In re Masden, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334, 335 (T.T.A.B.
1973) (finding that “Week-End Sex” is not a scandalous trademark for a magazine).
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general public’s conscience or moral feeling. The TTAB held that neither
of these requirements was met.90
D.   Examining the Evidence
1.   Evidence that “Redskins” Is Disparaging and Scandalous
The TTAB stated that in determining whether to cancel the Redskins
registration on the grounds the mark is disparaging to Native Americans,
or scandalous, it would examine the Redskins mark at the time it was
registered.91 The Delegation pointed to a significant amount of data to
show that, to Native Americans, the term Redskins was disparaging and
possibly scandalous.92
It has been suggested that the name Redskins was chosen initially
when the team played in Boston, as a tribute to the American patriots
who dressed up as Indians and dumped tea from English ships into the
Boston Harbor as part of the “Boston Tea Party.” The term Redskins has
also historically been used to refer to Native Americans. Even if the mark
does refer to participants of the Boston Tea Party, the mark can be dis-
paraging to Native Americans. In fact, in 1995 the Association of Ameri-
can Indian Affairs called for a boycott of Snapple because it believed
Snapple’s use of a historic painting of the Boston Tea Party on its iced
tea bottles perpetuated the image of savage Indians “upon which hun-
dreds of years of murder and oppression have been based.”93
The origin of the term “Redskin” probably does not come from any
characterization of Native Americans’ skin color, but rather, from the
European and Algonquian name for the Delaware Indians, whose men
would “streak their faces and bodies with bright red ocher and blood-
root, as well as white and yellow clays,” and had a “fondness for vermil-
ion makeup, concocted from fat mixed with berry juice.”94 However, at
least one dictionary defines “Redskin” as a North-American Indian, “so
called from the reddish or coppery color of the skin.”95
The Redskins fight song was further probative evidence that the Red-
skins’ mark was disparaging to Native Americans at the time it was reg-
istered, since it portrays Native Americans as inarticulate barbarians.96
The original lyrics of the Redskins’ fight song were:
                                                                                                                                                
90. See  Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1748-49 (P.T.O. 1999).
91. See  Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1832 (T.T.A.B. 1994); see
also Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma v. Parma Sausage Prod., Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1894, 1898-99 (T.T.A.B. 1992) (holding that the operative date to consider in determining
deceptiveness is the date of registration).
92. See  Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742-45.
93. David Menzies, Culture Jamming, FIN . POST , Dec. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL
4354339.
94. AMERICA’S FASCINATING INDIAN HERITAGE 118 (James A. Maxwell ed., 1978). For fur-
ther analysis of the negative portrayal of Native Americans in the United States, see RAYMOND
W. STEDMAN, SHADOWS OF THE INDIAN : STEREOTYPES IN AMERICAN CULTURE , (1982) and JOHN
E. O’CONNOR, HOLLYWOOD: STEREOTYPES OF NATIVE AMERICANS IN FILM  (1980).
95. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (Jean L. McKechnie ed. 1983).
96. See  Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
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Hail to the Redskins, hail victory! Braves on the warpath, fight for old
D.C.! Scalp ‘em, wamp ‘em, we will take ‘em big score. Read ‘em, weep
‘em, touchdown, we want heap more!97
2.   Evidence that “Redskins” Is Not Disparaging or Scandalous
Arguably, the significant support that teams with Native American
names have received from the Native American community itself shows
that the Redskins’ mark is not disparaging or scandalous but, rather,
pays tribute to Native Americans and reflects bravery, courage, pride
and a fighting spirit. The chief of the Cherokee tribe in North Carolina
stated that the Redskins name does not bother his tribe and feels the
name gives Native Americans recognition.98 Indeed, a Cherokee princess,
Pale Moon, even sang the national anthem before a 1991 Redskins
game.99 The tribe also has high regard for the Atlanta Braves, and
manufactures fake tomahawks for Braves fans.100
Examples of Native American support for other teams with Native
American names includes the statement of James Billie, chairman of the
Seminole Tribe of Florida, who asserts that Florida State University’s use
of the Seminole name for its team reflects a pride in Florida Seminole
history and is an ego boost to his tribe.101 Another example is the Illinois
Indians who have shown support for the University of Illinois football
team and its use of Native American imagery.102 Even the Cleveland In-
dians, with its grinning caricature Indian-head logo, which many find
highly offensive, was actually named in honor of Luis Francis Sockalexis,
the first Native American major league baseball player.103
Perhaps the strongest argument that the names are intended to be
symbolic of strength and bravery is the very fact that teams have chosen
to use such names. A name is chosen to encourage and serve as a rallying
point, not to demean the players. This of course does not mean that it is
not offensive to members of a group that do not want that group to be
popularly associated with violence and savagery.
E.   The TTAB’s Cancellation Decision
The TTAB began the legal analysis in its dispositive cancellation deci-
sion by noting it was addressing only the trademark registration, not the
use of such marks.104 To determine whether the Redskins trademarks
                                                                                                                                                
97. Hail to the Redskins, WASH. POST , Jan. 20, 1984, at N7.
98. See  Leonard Shapiro, Offensive Penalty Is Called on “Redskins”: Native American
Tribes Protest the Name, WASH. POST ., Nov. 3, 1991, at D1.
99. See  id.
100. See  id.
101. See  Jack Wheat, Real Seminoles Resent the Profits FSU Makes off Their Tribal Name,
MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 11, 1993, at 7B. The article notes that Billie, however, does not enjoy the
full support of all Seminoles. See id.
102. Jim Parsons, Indians Say Fight over Nicknames Isn’t Going Away, MINNEAPOLIS-ST.
PAUL STAR TRIB., Oct. 21, 1995, at 1A.
103. See  Laurel R. Davis, Protest Against the Use of Native American Mascots: A Chal-
lenge to Traditional American Identity , 17 J. S PORT & SOC. ISSUES  9 (1993) (refe rring to the
Mascot “Chief Wahoo”).
104. See  Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1740-41 (P.T.O. 1999).
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were disparaging, the TTAB used a two-step process. First it examined
the meaning of the challenged trademarks. Second, it examined whether
such meaning was disparaging to Native Americans.105 The TTAB an-
swered these questions within the appropriate time context from 1967 to
1990, the years the marks were registered.106 Based on the evidence be-
fore it, including dictionary definitions, the TTAB determined that the
marks did, in fact, refer to Native Americans.107 The TTAB also found
that, by at least a preponderance of the evidence, it was established that,
as of the dates of registration, the marks (as used in connection with the
identified services) did disparage Native Americans as perceived by a
substantial composite of Native Americans.108
However, in reaching its determination, the TTAB rejected the view
of several of the petitioner’s witnesses that the use of Native-American
imagery is disparaging per se  to Native Americans.109 Indeed, with re-
spect to the images of a Native American (in profile) and a spear design,
as incorporated in the marks, the TTAB found that the Delegation had
not established that such images, in context, disparaged Native Ameri-
cans.110 This element of the TTAB’s decision is crucial because it bears on
trademarks of other sports teams that use Native American names. Ac-
cordingly, challenges to such marks will still have to prove that they have
a pegorative meaning, and are disparaging in the context of their use.
Similarly, the TTAB also relied on a two-step process to determine
whether the marks were scandalous. The TTAB first assessed the likely
meaning of the marks. 111 Next, the TTAB assessed whether the marks,
given their meaning, were scandalous to a substantial composite of the
general public.112 The TTAB again found that the Redskins’ marks clearly
alluded to Native Americans.113 However, the TTAB then found that the
Delegation had failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the marks, in the context of their use, were scandalous. The Delega-
tion failed to establish that the marks “would be ‘shocking to the sense of
truth, decency, or propriety’ to, or ‘giv[e] offense to the conscience or
moral feelings [of,] excit[e] reprobation, [or] call out for condemnation’
by, a substantial composite of the general population.”114
F.   The Florida State University Seminoles
The TTAB’s recent decision canceling the Redskins’ trademarks
might further elevate the debate as to whether Florida State University
(FSU) should continue to use “Seminoles” as its teams’ names, but it is
unlikely to result in the cancellation of any of the University’s federally
                                                                                                                                                
105. See  id .
106. See  id .
107. See  id . at 1741-42.
108. See  id . at 1743.
109. See  id .
110. See  id .
111. See  id.  at 1747-48.
112. See  id .
113. See  id .
114. Id. at 1748-49 (citing In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1923, 1925
(T.T.A.B. 1994)).
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registered trademarks. As noted, in reaching its determination regarding
the Redskins’ trademarks, the TTAB rejected the view that the use of
Native American imagery in the sports context is per se  disparaging to
Native Americans.115 Furthermore, a challenge asserting that “Semino-
les” is disparaging to Native Americans would have to show that the
meaning of the challenged trademark was disparaging to Native Ameri-
cans.116 Clearly, the name “Seminoles” refers to the Native American
tribe. A challenge to an FSU Seminole trademark on the ground that it is
disparaging is therefore likely to fail, because no derogatory racial impli-
cation is inherent in the name. Furthermore, it would be hard to show
that Native Americans find the name disparaging, when members of the
tribe itself support its use.117 As noted, James Billie, chairman of the
Seminole Tribe of Florida, has stated that FSU’s use of the Seminole
name for its team reflects a pride in Florida Seminole history and is an
ego boost to his tribe.118 Given the support of the Seminole tribe itself it
is also hard to imagine that the Seminole team name “would be ‘shock-
ing to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety’ to, or ‘giv[e] offense to
the conscience or moral feelings [of,] excit[e] reprobation, [or] call out
for condemnation’ by, a substantial composite of the general popula-
tion.”119
III.   ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES FOR NATIVE AMERICANS
If the Federal Circuit overturns the TTAB’s decision, Native American
groups might look towards other legal remedies in confronting misch-
aracterization. In recent years the Native American community has in-
voked intellectual property laws more frequently to assert self-
determination and to protect cultural identity, and the Native American
community now has several avenues through which to address the mis-
appropriation and improper use of Native American culture and
names.120 Although these remedies would not likely have been appropri-
ate to stop the use of the Redskins mark, they might succeed in stopping
other teams from using Indian related names and marks.
Native Americans may be able to stem the registration and use of Na-
tive American cultural icons based on another provision of section
1052(a), which prohibits registration of a mark that “[c]onsists of or
comprises . . . matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a conne c-
tion with persons, living or dead . . . .”121 Arguably, marks that misappro-
                                                                                                                                                
115. See  id . at 1743.
116. See  id . at 1737.
117. See  Jack Wheat, Real Seminoles Resent the Profits FSU Makes off Their Tribal Name,
MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 11, 1993, at 7B.
118. See  id.
119. Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1748-49.
120. Native American names currently are used on many products without any need for
permission or authorization. See  SUSAN L. STETLER , BRANDS & THEIR COMPANIES (11th ed.
1993); see  also COMPANIES AND THEIR BRANDS (13th ed. 1995).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See, e.g., University of Notre Dame du Lac
v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983); University of Ala. v. BAMA-
Werke Curt Baumann, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 408 (T.T.A.B. 1986); In re Cotter & Co., 228
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 202 (T.T.A.B. 1985); Buffett v. Chi-Chi’s, Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 428
(T.T.A.B. 1985).
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priate Native American names or culture falsely suggest a connection
with particular persons, namely Native Americans. These marks may be
seen as signifying that the goods carrying such marks are produced by,
or are in some way associated with, Native Americans. However, a recent
TTAB decision indicates that such arguments will be successful only
where the misappropriated term is recognized as referring uniquely to
Native Americans.122
Alternatively, the Native American community may be able to seek
redress through tort actions, such as defamation and the right of public-
ity, which may be brought in tribal courts. 123 A recent tribal decision
found that the right of publicity does exist under tribal law.124
In In re Tasunke Witko , descendants of Tasunke Witko invoked the
Rosebud Sioux tribal legal process to oppose the marketing of a malt liq-
uor named “Crazy Horse.”125 The plaintiffs sought an injunction against
the misappropriation and misuse of the name Crazy Horse, a written
public apology, and compensation, including traditional damages of one
braid of tobacco, a racehorse, and a four-point Pendleton blanket for
each state and month in which the liquor was sold.126
While In re Tasunke Witko was ultimately dismissed for lack of juris-
diction, the case established the tribal right to control publicity of tribal
names and identities.127 The tribal court system is an expression of feder-
ally recognized sovereign authority.128 Ho wever, the tribal courts are not
completely free from regulation by the United States government, and
are subject to statutes like the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.129 The Su-
preme Court has pushed tribal courts to conform to federal and state le-
gal systems; however, tribal judges have also begun applying traditional
                                                                                                                                                
122. See In re Indian Nation Leather Co., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539, 1540 (T.T.A.B. 1997)
(reversing refusal of registration because it was not established that term “Indian Nation” re-
ferred uniquely to Native Americans).
123. The right of publicity protects an individual’s right to choose how his name and iden -
tity will be exploited for commercial use, if at all. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for So-
cial Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
124. See  Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse ,
27 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1050 (1995) (citing In re Tasunke Witko, Civ. No. 93-204, at 11).
125. See  id.
126. See  id.  at 1048.
127. See  id. at 1050 (noting the court announced that tribal law does recognize the right of
publicity, while at the same time it refused to address the merits of the case). For further dis-
cussion of the tribal court system and the interaction of tribal law with intellectual property
rights, see Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Iden -
tity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J. OF L. & JURIS. 249
(1993); Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content
and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203 (1989); Sidney L. Harring, The In -
corporation of Alaskan Natives Under American Law: United States and Tlingit Sovereignty,
31 ARIZ. L. R EV. 279 (1989); Jessica R. Herrera, Not Even His Name: Is the Denigration of
Crazy Horse Custer’s F inal Revenge, 29 H ARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 175 (1994); Chief Justice Tom
Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225 (1989); Christine
Zuni, The Southwest Intertribal Court of Appeals, 24 N.M. L. R EV. 309 (1994).
128. See  Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Im-
pact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC. R EV. 1123, 1145 (1994); see  also  Judith Res-
nik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI . L. R EV.
671, 691 (1989).
129. See  25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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and customary law in adjudicating disputes.130 One of the major chal-
lenges to bringing an action in tribal court is the jurisdictional limitation
of the tribal court. However, a non-Indian defendant wishing to chal-
lenge the tribal court’s jurisdiction must first bring the challenge in the
tribal court, and appeal it to a tribal appellate court.131 Only after the
tribal case has been completed may a challenge to jurisdiction be
brought in federal court.132
In addition to seeking a remedy in tribal court, the Native American
community may also look to the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935133
(IACA) for the intellectual property protections it creates. In 1990, Con-
gress overhauled the IACA to expand the protection of Native American
arts and crafts by encouraging tribes to register their trademarks and by
assisting Native American artisans in marketing their works.134 The un-
derlying policy of IACA is to promote the economic welfare of Native
American tribes and to protect consumers through the creation and reg-
istration of trademarks of genuineness and quality.135
Under IACA, an Indian Arts and Crafts Board is charged with devel-
oping and expanding the market for Native American products. The In-
dian Arts and Crafts Board has the authority to create trademarks of
genuineness and quality for Native American products, to establish
standards and regulations for the use of such trademarks, to register
such trademarks through the PTO at no charge, to pursue or defend in
court any PTO determination, and to conduct market research and tech-
nical research.136 The IACA provides for injunctive relief, equitable relief,
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.137
                                                                                                                                                
130. See  generally Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24
N.M. L. REV. 225, 244-56 (1994) (discussing the role of custom in the development of Indian
law); Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing
and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS . L. R EV. 219, 268-74
(1986) (discussing Supreme Court decisions designed to hamper the development of Indian
tribal law as distinct from U.S. sovereignty).
131. See  Kevin Gover & Robert Laurence, Avoiding Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: The
Litigation in Federal Court of Civil Actions Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 8 HAMLINE L.
REV. 497, 499-500 (1985) (discussing sovereign immunity in Native Amer ican law and the de-
velopment of jurisdiction for tribal courts).
132. See  Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union , 26 WILLAMETTE L. R EV.
841, 844-66 (1990) (exploring the relationship between tribal courts and the federal union); see
also Timothy W. Joranko, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts After National
Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual: Toward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts by the
Federal Judicial System, 78 MINN. L. REV. 259, 269 (1993).
133. See  Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935, ch. 748, 49 Stat. 891 (1935) (current version at
25 U.S.C. §§ 305-305f (1994)).
134. See  Act of Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (amending 25 U.S.C. §§
305a, 305d, 305e (1989)).
135. See  25 U.S.C. § 305a (1994).
136. See  25 U.S.C. 305a(g)(1)-(4).
137. See  25 U.S.C. § 305e. For further discussion of the effort to protect cultural property,
see generally Richard A. Guest, Intellectual Property Rights and Native American Tribes, 20
AM . INDIAN L. REV. 111, 134-35 (1995-96) (discussing the underlying purposes of the IACA);
Suzan Shown Harjo, Native Peoples’ Cultural and Human Rights: An Unfin ished Agenda, 24
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 321, 328 (1992) (discussing the necessity for protecting Native American culture
from exploitation); J.H. Merryman, The Public Inte rest in Cultural Property , 77 CAL. L. R EV.
339, 355-64 (1989) (discussing the elements of an appropriate public policy regarding cultural
property); Rennard Strickland & Kathy Supernaw, Back to the Future: A Proposed Model
Tribal Act to Protect Native Cultural Heritage, 46 ARK. L. REV. 161, 163-67 (1993) (discussing
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In the future, the Native American community may want to invoke
the false suggestion prohibition of the Lanham Act’s section 43(a), tribal
court tort actions, or IACA actions, in addition to the Lanham Act’s dis-
paraging and scandalous prohibitions, to stop the misappropriation of
Native American cultural names and mark.
IV.   TRADEMARK ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED
 IN CHOOSING A NEW NAME
In light of the TTAB’s decision, Pro Football should seriously consider
changing the Redskins’ team name. A name change might reap the
goodwill of Native Americans who were offended by the team’s name
and of sympathizing fans. This goodwill should be especially valuable to
a team who many still remember as being the last team in the NFL to
hire African-American players.138 The main disadvantage to Pro Football
in changing the name would be losing the ongoing use of the Redskins
mark and the goodwill in the team name. However, drawing from the
experience of other teams, if may be concluded that the team may be
able to retain this vested goodwill if it chooses a proper replacement
name.
If Pro Football does decide to rename the Redskins, the new team
name will need to be something that has fan appeal and market presence
and that can serve as a rally cry. However, the new name must not in-
fringe on any existing marks. The Jacksonville Jaguars experience is a
reminder to teams that, when selecting a new name, it is important to
ensure that the new name does not infringe on an existing mark.139
Similarly, the Washington Wizards experience in choosing their new
team name provides guidance as to what issues teams should consider in
avoiding reverse confusion and trademark infringement.140 Finally, the
Indianapolis Colts experience indicates that teams should also consider
protecting their legal rights in relation to their former name.141
A.   Trademark Confusion and the Jacksonville Jaguars
In 1991 the NFL Jacksonville expansion team announced that the
team’s new name would be the “Jaguars.”142 Soon thereafter, Jaguar
Cars, Ltd. filed a federal trademark infringement suit in the Southern
                                                                                                                                                
NAGPRA, and suggesting a model ordinance for tribes to help them fulfill their significant du -
ties under NAGPRA); Rennard Strickland, Implementing the National Policy of Understand-
ing, Preserving and Safeguarding the Heritage of Indian Peoples and Native Hawaiians:
Human Rights, Sacred Objects, and Cultural Patrimony, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175, 175-76 (1992)
(discussing the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) and its role
in a national policy to preserve Native American and Native Hawaiian heritage).
138. It was not until December 14, 1961, that Redskins owner George Preston Marshall fi-
nally ended his segregationist policies, the last NFL owner to do so. See  THOMAS BOSWELL ET
AL., REDSKINS : A HISTORY OF WASHINGTON’S TEAM  43 (1997).
139. See  Jaguar Cars, Ltd. v. National Football League, 886 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
140. See  Harlem Wizards Entertainment Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Properties, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1084 (D.N.J. 1997).
141. See  Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, 34 F.3d 410 (7th
Cir. 1994).
142. See  Jaguar Cars, 886 F. Supp. at 337.
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District of New York alleging, among other things, that Jacksonville’s
name choice would cause a likelihood of confusion with the company’s
mark and therefore violated the Lanham Act.143 In response, Jacksonville
filed for a federal declaratory judgment action, in Jacksonville, arguing
that the team name was the result of a fan contest and paid tribute to the
fact that Jacksonville’s zoo was home to the oldest living Jaguar in North
America.144 In 1995, the Southern District of New York decided it was the
proper venue to adjudicate the dispute.145 Soon thereafter, an apparent
settlement was reached with Jacksonville keeping the Jaguar name but
redesigning their emblem, and Ford Car Company, the parent corpora-
tion of Jaguar Cars, designated the team’s official automobile.146
Trademark infringement is governed by Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, which provides that:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, . . .
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or mis-
leading description of fact, or false or misleading representa tion of
fact, which—(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,
or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities or geographic origin of his or her or
another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be li-
able in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.147
To prevail on a trademark infringement claim under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) the marks are valid and
legally protectable; (2) the marks are owned by the plaintiff; and (3) the
defendant’s use of the marks to identify goods or services is likely to cre-
ate confusion concerning the origin of the goods or services.”148
A plaintiff demonstrates a mark’s validity and its legally protectability
by showing that the mark is federally registered and has become “in-
contestable” under the Lanham Act.149 However, if the mark has not been
federally registered, or if a registered mark has not achieved “incontest-
able” status, then the mark is still valid and legally protectable “if the
                                                                                                                                                
143. See  Plaintiff’s Complaint, Jaguar Cars, Ltd. v. National Football League, No. 94-CIV-
3529, (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1994). Jaguar Cars has brought a number of other suits to stop poten -
tial infringement of its mark. See, e.g., Jaguar Cars Ltd. v. Skandrani, 771 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.
Fla. 1991).
144. See  Plaintiff’s Complaint, Jacksonville Jaguars, Ltd. v. Jaguar Cars, Ltd., No. 94-537-
Civ-J-10 (M.D. Fla., June 2, 1994).
145. See  Jaguar Cars, Ltd. v. National Football League, 886 F. Supp. 335, 340 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
146. See  Jaguars Suit Settled, NEWSDAY, Mar. 1, 1995, at A48.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
148. Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod ., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir. 1991) (cit ing
Opticians Ass’n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir.
1990)).
149. See  15 U.S.C. §§ 1058 & 1065 (1994).
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public recognizes it as identifying the claimant’s ‘goods or services and
distinguishing them from those of others.’”150
B.   Standard Confusion and the Polaroid Test
In choosing a new team name, Pro Football will likely want to retain
the vested goodwill that the Redskins mark enjoys as the result of the
team’s legacy of accomplishments. The Redskins began in 1932 as the
Boston Braves, a team that played on Braves Field, in Boston, Massachu-
setts.151 The team moved in 1933 to Fenway Park and changed their name
to the Boston Redskins.152 In 1937 the team moved to Washington, D.C.
The Redskins won NFL Title championships in 1937 and 1942, and won
the Super Bowl in 1982, 1987, and 1991.153 The Redskins won division
championships in 1936, 1937, 1940, 1942, 1943, 1945, 1972, 1982, 1983,
1984, 1987, and 1991.154
The Redskins can incorporate the team’s history into a new name by
choosing a new name that evokes and encompasses its impressive his-
tory. At the same time, Pro Football can end the use of a name that many
in the Native American community consider pejorative. One way to ref-
erence the goodwill vested in “Redskins” would be to shorten the name
to the “Washington Reds.” Washington Reds recalls the history, tradi-
tion, and success of the Washington Redskins. In fact, the team could
use uniforms they have used in the past, which have an encircled “R” on
the helmet instead of the Indian head they currently use.155
This suggestion is made without the benefit of a trademark search to
see if a Reds mark is currently being used or is registered to an entity
providing a similar product. In choosing a new name, however, the Red-
skins would be wise to avoid the difficulties faced by the Jacksonville
Jaguars and stay clear of any potential trademark infringement. There-
fore, before the name Reds is finalized, it will be necessary to undertake
a standard confusion analysis, since the team name Reds is already used
by the Cincinnati Reds, a long established Major League Baseball (MLB)
team. In fact, the Cincinnati Reds also arrived at their name by shorten-
ing their former name—“Redlegs.”156
If Pro Football’s new name, Reds, causes confusion with the Cincin-
nati Reds mark at all, it is likely to be standard trademark confusion, be-
cause the Cincinnati Reds’ mark is a long established, popularly known
mark. Whether or not the name Reds, as used for an NFL team, would
create a likelihood of confusion with the Cincinnati Reds’ mark should
be determined by employing the standard likelihood of confusion, mul-
                                                                                                                                                
150. A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting 1 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 15.1 (2d ed.
1984)).
151. See  NFL Nicknames, GANNETT NEWS SERVICES , Dec. 16, 1998, available in  1998 WL
5639173.
152. See  id .
153. See  BOSWELL , supra note 138 .
154. See  id .
155. See  id . at 91.
156. See CNN/SI web page, Historical Baseball Profiles, (visited on Jan. 5, 1997)
<http://cgi.cnnsi.com/baseball/mlb/historical_profiles/index.NL.teams.html>.
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tiple variable test, first established in Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elec-
tronics Corp.157
Using the Polaroid test, Pro Football should consider the strength of
the Cincinnati Reds’ mark; the degree of similarity between a Washing-
ton Reds mark and the existing Cincinnati Reds mark; the proximity in
the marketplace of a professional football team’s name and a profes-
sional baseball team’s name; the likelihood that the owners of the Cin-
cinnati Reds will field a professional football team; the quality of the
services and goods offered by Pro Football’s football team; and the so-
phistication of fans of professional football and professional baseball.
Arguably, no likelihood of confusion would exist, as the teams are as-
sociated with different professional sports. The Washington Reds would
use a different logo than the Cincinnati Reds and would employ the NFL
mark, which is distinct from the MLB mark; Pro Football would be
choosing the new name in good faith; and professional sports fans are
sophisticated and can make distinctions between similar sports marks,
as evidenced by the existence of a number of professional teams that
share names, such as the National Hockey League (NHL) Jets and the
NFL Jets, the NHL Kings and the National Basketball Association (NBA)
Kings, the NFL Cardinals, and the MLB Cardinals, and the NFL Giants
and the MLB Giants.
While the Reds is but one suggestion, trademark entrepreneurs may
want to consider finding a way to register their best guess of what, if
anything, the Redskins might choose as their new team name. Such en-
trepreneurs might find even greater success than the Los Angeles attor-
ney who, in 1979, guessed the Oakland Raiders would win their antitrust
suit against the NFL, and took out a state trademark on “Los Angeles
Raiders.” When the team moved to Los Angeles, the attorney settled the
potential trademark infringement for season tickets on the 50-yard
line.158
C.   Reverse Confusion and the Washington Wizards
 In an ordinary trademark infringement case, the alleged trademark
infringer takes advantage of the reputation and good will of a senior
trademark owner by adopting a similar or identical mark.159 In contrast,
                                                                                                                                                
157. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). In Polaroid, the court adopted the test of the Restatement
of Torts , and examined the following eight criteria in determining whether likelihood of confu -
sion existed between two trademarks:
(1) the strength of the senior mark;
(2) the degree of similarity between the senior and junior mark;
(3) the proximity of the products in the marketplace;
(4) the likelihood that the senior user will bridge the gap, and enter the junior
user’s market;
(5) actual confusion between the marks;
(6) the junior user’s good faith in adopting the mark;
(7) the quality of the junior user’s product; and
(8) the sophistication of the relevant consumers.
Id. at 495.
158. See  Lawrie Mifflin & Michael Katz, Raiding a Name, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1982, at D1.
159. See  Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 473-74, (3d Cir.
1994).
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reverse confusion arises when a larger, more powerful entity adopts the
trademark of a smaller, less powerful trademark user, thereby causing
confusion as to the origin of the senior trademark user’s goods or serv-
ices. 160 Because the junior user is a larger company with greater financial
ability and trademark recognition in the marketplace, it can easily over-
whelm the senior user by flooding the market with promotion of its
similar trademark. 161 The strength of the junior user’s promotional cam-
paigns leads consumers to believe that the senior user’s products derive
from that of the junior user or that the senior user is actually the trade-
mark infringer.162 Consequently, the senior user loses its trademark value
and its ability to expand into new markets.
Alleged reverse confusion stemming from renaming a professional
sports team was recently examined in Harlem Wizards Entertainment
Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Properties, Inc.163 Harlem Wizards Entertain-
ment Basketball, Inc. (Harlem Wizards) is a “theatrical basketball orga-
nization that performs ‘show basketball’ in the tradition of the Harlem
Globetrotters.”164 In Harlem Wizards, the team sought to prevent the
Capital Bullets Basketball Club from using the name “Washington Wiz-
ards.” On February 22, 1996, the Capital Bullets Basketball Club, com-
monly known as the “Washington Bullets,” a member team of the NBA,
“publicly announced that beginning with the 1997-1998 NBA season, the
team would formally change its name to the ‘Washington Wizards’.”165
Founded in 1961, the franchise originated in Chicago where it was first
known as the Chicago Packers and later, the Chicago Zephyrs.166 The
team relocated to Baltimore, Maryland in 1963 and became known as the
Baltimore Bullets.167 In 1973, the team moved to Washington, D.C. and
changed its name to the Capital Bullets.168 The following year, the team
adopted the name the Washington Bullets.169 The Bullets changed their
name to the Wizards because of concerns that the name “Bullets” had a
negative and violent connotation.170 Soon after the Bullets announced the
name change, the Harlem Wizards filed a lawsuit against the Washing-
                                                                                                                                                
160. See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957-61 (7th Cir.
1992) (finding that Quaker Oats Co.’s use of “Thirst Aid” for its product Gatorade in fringed on
the registered “Thirst-Aid” trademark owned and used by small Vermont beverage company);
Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1988) (enjoining
Bloomingdales Department stores from using mark “B-Wear” on clothing and in its stores be-
cause it infringed on the unregistered trademark “Bee-Wear” belonging to smaller women’s
clothing marketer).
161. See  Fisons, 30 F.3d at 474-75.
162. See  Harlem Wizards Entertainment Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Properties, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1084, 1091 (D.N.J. 1997).
163. See  id.  at 1086.
164. Id.
165. Id. The NBA, which celebrates its fiftieth anniversary this year, is made up of twenty-
nine member teams that play annually against each other from November un til June. The
league is divided into two conferences, Eastern and Western, and four divisions, Atlantic, Mid -
west, Central and Pacific. See  id.
166. See  id.  at 1088.
167. See  id.
168. See  id.
169. See  id.
170. Along with its name change, the Washington Bullets unveiled a new anti-violence ini-
tiative that concentrated on Washington, D.C., junior high and middle schools. See  id.
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ton Bullets, alleging that the proposed change infringed the Harlem
Wizards’ trademark in violation of section 43 of the Lanham Act, The
New Jersey Trademark Act, and common law.171
The proof necessary to maintain an action for trademark infringe-
ment depends upon whether the goods or services offered by the trade-
mark owner and alleged infringer are competitive or noncompetitive.172
If the action involves competing goods, “the court need rarely look be-
yond the mark itself.”173 In such cases, the court simply analyzes whether
the similarity of the marks engenders confusion.174 In actions where the
goods are non-competing, “the similarity of the marks is only one of a
number of factors the court must examine to determine the likelihood of
confusion.”175 Likelihood of confusion exists if the consuming public as-
sumes upon viewing a mark that the products or service represented by
the mark is associated with a different product or service represented by
a similar mark.176 If the goods or services are noncompeting, the court
must look beyond the trademark to the nature of the products them-
selves, and to the context in which they are marketed and sold. 177 The
closer the relationship between the products, and the more similar their
sale contexts, the greater the likelihood of confusion.178
In considering a new name and the potential trademark infringement
concerns accompanying such new name, the Redskins will also have to
weigh the strength of any marks similar to the new name. The stronger
any such other mark is, the greater the likelihood of infringement.
Trademark law evaluates marks along a continuum of distinctiveness,
from the nondistinctive to the inherently distinctive: Marks are (1) ge-
neric, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive or (4) arbitrary, or fanciful.
A generic term functions as the common descriptive name of a class
of products and are generally not legally protectable. An example of a
generic term that cannot be used as a trademark is the word “chocolate
fudge.”179 A descriptive mark immediately conveys a characteristic, in-
gredient or quality of the article or service it identifies. This type of mark
acquires protected status only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
goods or services have achieved secondary meaning. For example, the
mark “Transfer Print” was found to be descriptive for surface decorating
machines, related technical machines, material and related technical
services to distributors and manufacturers who require designs or words
                                                                                                                                                
171. See  id.  at 1086.
172. See  Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472-73 (3d Cir.
1994).
173. Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that if the
mark is distinctive or has acquired sufficient secondary meaning, a comparison to the chal-
lenged mark is sufficient).
174. See  Fisons, 30 F.3d at 472-73; see  also Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership Composed
of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying a similar standard).
175. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 473.
 176. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 2301[1].
177. See  Fisons, 30 F.3d at 473 (quoting Lapp, 721 F.2d at 462 (citations omitted)).
178. See  id.
179. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); A.J. Can field Co.
v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291 at 292 (3d Cir. 1986).
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placed on their products; therefore, it had likely acquired a secondary
meaning.180
Suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful marks are afforded the highest level
of trademark protection.181 A suggestive mark requires the consumer to
use imagination, thought or perception to determine the character of the
goods or service. The “Taj Mahal,” for example is thought to suggest
through imagination an Indian restaurant.182 Lastly, an arbitrary mark
employs terms that do not describe or suggest any attribute of goods or
services sold and a fanciful mark uses unfamiliar language coined ex-
pressly for the purpose of trademark protection.183
Generally, as noted above, likelihood of confusion is determined by
the Polaroid  test, and should be of concern to the Redskins’ decision to
change its name.184 Because of the significant promotion and marketing
strength that the Redskins would likely employ to popularize any new
name the team would adopt, however, the Redskins will need to be par-
ticularly concerned with creating reverse confusion. After concluding
that the “Harlem Wizards” mark was suggestive,185 the court in Harlem
Wizards applied a modified ten-factor Polaroid test to determine
whether reverse confusion arises when a team’s new name is confused
with an existing mark.186
                                                                                                                                                
180. See  Transfer Print Foils, Inc. v. Transfer Print America, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 425, 438
(D.N.J. 1989).
181. See  AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979).
182. See  Taj Mahal Enterprises, Ltd. v. Trump, 745 F. Supp. 240, 251 (D.N.J. 1990) (noting
that “Taj Mahal” is suggestive of an Indian restaurant).
183. See  Sunenblick v. Harrell, 895 F. Supp. 616, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
184. See  supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing the Polaroid test).
185. See  Harlem Wizards Entertainment Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Properties, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1084, 1093 (D.N.J. 1997).
186.  These factors are:
(1) the degree of similarity between the owner’s mark and the alleged infringing
mark;
(2) the strength of owner’s mark;
(3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and atten tion ex-
pected of consumers when making a purchase;
(4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual
confusion arising;
(5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark;
(6) the evidence of actual confusion;
(7) whether the goods or services, though not competing, are marketed through the
same channels of trade and advertised through the same media;
(8) the extent to which the targets of the parties sales efforts are the same;
(9) the relationship of the goods or services in the minds of consumers because of
similarity of function; and
(10) other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the defendant’s
market, or that he is likely to expand into that market.
Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1094. Under the assumption that Pro Football is, or should
be, considering renaming the Redskins, the Harlem Wizards court’s interpretation and appl i-
cation of these factors bears analysis. See  also Fisons, 30 F.3d at 473; Dranoff-Perlstein Assoc.
v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 862-863 (3d Cir. 1992); Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod., Inc.,
930 F.2d 277, 293 (3d Cir. 1991); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir.
1983); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978).
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The court first addressed whether the services offered by the parties
were similar.187 In the court’s view, this is the dispositive factor regarding
the existence of any likelihood of confusion.188 The court found that al-
though both were “Wizard” marks used by basketball teams, the services
offered by the teams show basketball, as opposed to professional basket-
ball, were not sufficiently similar so as to cause a likelihood of confu-
sion.189 This apparently limits the Redskins concern to other NFL teams,
and perhaps teams in other professional football leagues such as the
Arena Football Legue and the Canadian Football League. This proposi-
tion is based on the logical analogy that it is hard to imagine any other
services that are more similar to each other than professional show bas-
ketball is to professional basketball.
The Harlem Wizards court ruled that in considering the similarity
between two marks, the court must compare the appearance, sound and
meaning of the marks, as well as the manner in which they are used.190
When making such a comparison, the relevant factor is “the overall im-
pression created by the mark as a whole rather than simply comparing
the individual features of the marks.” 191 Marks “are confusingly similar if
ordinary consumers would likely conclude that . . . [the products or
services] share a common source, affiliation, connection or sponsor-
ship.”192
The court in Harlem Wizards found that in trademark actions in-
volving picture or design marks, similarity of appearance is control-
ling. 193 However, similarity is not limited to the eye or ear. The mental
impact of a similarity of meaning may be so pervasive as to outweigh any
visual or phonetic differences.194 If two marks create essentially the same
overall impression, it is likely that courts will find the two marks con-
fusingly similar.195 Nevertheless, “similarity of the marks is merely one of
the relevant factors, and it is not dispositive on the issue of likelihood of
                                                                                                                                                
187. See Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1094; see  also Murray v. Cable Nat’l Broadcast-
ing Co., 86 F.3d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that when the court determines that the
goods or services are unrelated and confusion is unlikely, the complaint should be dismissed).
188. See  Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1094.
189. See  id.  at 1095. See also  W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d
567, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that mark “Right Guard,” “Sport Stick” for deodorant was
found not to be in competitive proximity with mark “Sportstick” used for a lip balm, even
though both generally defined as personal care products); Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing
Co., Inc., 949 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that defendant’s use of “New Choices For
The Best Years” for a magazine and plaintiff’s use of “New Choices Press” for a publishing house
was not likely to cause reverse confusion); Swanson v. Georgetown Collection, Inc., No. 94CV-
1283, 1995 WL 72717 at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1995) (holding that reverse confusion was un -
likely between marks “Faraway Friends” for porcelain dolls and Far Away Friends for cloth
dolls).
190. See  Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1096 ; see  also Taj Mahal Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Trump, 745 F. Supp. 240, 247 (D.N.J. 1990) (citing Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesar’s Palace, 490
F. Supp. 818, 824 (D.N.J. 1980)).
191. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 975 (11th Cir. 1983).
192. Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 477 (3d Cir. 1994).
193. See Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1096; see  also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 54, §
23.07.
194. See  Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1096 (quoting 3 J. M CCARTHY, supra note 54, §
23.08).
195. See  Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod ., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293 (3d Cir. 1991);
Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Independent Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 1990).
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confusion.”196 Furthermore, the court found that the use of a design as
part of a mark minimizes any likelihood of confusion. 197 The court in
Harlem Wizards  found it significant that the Washington Bullets’ logo
would have a unique design and color scheme and would contain the
NBA’s distinctive logo.198 This is also a positive precedent for Pro Foot-
ball, because a new team name for the Redskins would likely be accom-
panied by a unique design and color scheme as well as the NFL’s logo. 199
The court in Harlem Wizards  noted the widely accepted notion that
consumers are less likely to be confused about the origin of specific
goods or services if the goods are expensive, because the amount of care
and attention consumers expend increases proportionately as the price
of the desired goods or services increases. 200 Moreover, the court found
that, generally, NBA fans are sophisticated and knowledgeable; they read
about their favorite teams in the sports pages or listen to sports broad-
casts and commentary on television and radio. The court concluded,
therefore, that it was unlikely that consumers would attend a Harlem
Wizards’ game expecting to see NBA basketball or purchase NBA tickets
expecting to see the Harlem Wizards perform show basketball. This is
also a positive precedent for Pro Football, since NFL tickets are compa-
rably priced to NBA tickets, and NFL fans are similarly knowledgeable of
their sport.
Significantly, the Harlem Wizards court also noted a distinction in
reverse confusion cases regarding the importance of intent in determi n-
ing the likelihood of confusion. Ordinarily, the relevant intent inquiry in
a trademark infringement case involves determining “whether the de-
fendant adopted a mark with the intent of promoting confusion and ap-
propriating the prior user’s good will.”201 The court indicated that in re-
verse confusion cases the intent of a junior user in adopting a mark is
less significant in determining infringement, since the junior user does
not attempt to “take advantage of the senior’s good will”, but rather
“seeks to overwhelm it.”202 The court “identified as a more appropriate
inquiry whether the defendant was careless in conducting its trademark
name search and in considering the likelihood of confusion with other
companies that used similar marks.” 203 The court found no evidence of
such carelessness by the Washington Bullets in selecting its new mark or
                                                                                                                                                
196. See  Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1096; Taj Mahal Enterprises, Ltd. v. Trump, 745
F. Supp. 240, 247 (D.N.J. 1990).
197. See  3 MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 23.15[5].
198. Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1096.
199. Traditionally, the strength of a trademark is dependent on its distinctiveness, or more
precisely, its tendency to identify the goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particu -
lar, although possibly anonymous, source. See  Taj Mahal, 745 F. Supp. at 248 (quoting McGre-
gor-Doninger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc. 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979)). Note that a mark can be
highly distinctive yet still commercially weak if it does not identify goods as emanating from a
particular source. See  Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1097.
200. See  Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1097; see also Taj Mahal , 745 F. Supp. at 248-
49; Restaurant Lutece, Inc. v. Houbigant, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 588, 595 (D.N.J. 1984).
201. Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 479 (3d Cir. 1994)
(quoting W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. The Gillette Co., 808 F. Supp. 1013, 1042
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
202. Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1098 (citing Fisons, 30 F.3d at 479).
203. Id.
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in considering the likelihood of confusion with existing marks.204 There-
fore, it found no evidence that the Washington Bullets had adopted the
name “Wizards” in bad faith.205
Finally, a crucial factor in cases involving non-competitive goods and
services is the likelihood that the owner of a mark similar to the Red-
skins’ new name will expand into the Redskins market. This is because
one of the “chief reasons for granting a trademark owner protection in a
market not his own is to protect his right someday to enter the mar-
ket.”206 In Harlem Wizards, the court found that since there was no like-
lihood that the Harlem Wizards planned to play professional competi-
tive basketball, such factor weighed in favor of the Washington Wiz-
ards.207
Based on its multi-prong analysis, the court in Harlem Wizards con-
cluded that the Washington Bullets’ adoption of the Washington Wiz-
ards as its new name posed no likelihood of injury to the Harlem Wiz-
ards in the marketplace. Therefore, the court dismissed the Harlem Wiz-
ards’ federal and state law claims. The Harlem Wizards decision is an
important and encouraging decision for any professional sports team
that might be considering changing its name. In light of this decision, if
Pro Football chooses to rename the Redskins, it will need to compare
any potential new team name against any existing, protected, similar
marks. These comparisons must determine 1) the degree of similarity
between the potential new team name and the existing mark; 2) the
strength of the existing mark; 3) the care and attention of Redskins fans,
and purchasers of the products bearing the existing mark; 4) the actual
confusion that might be created between the new team name and an ex-
isting mark; 5) whether the goods or services sold under the new team
name are marketed through the same channels of trade and advertised
through the same media as the products bearing the existing mark; 6)
the extent to which the targets of the new team name sales efforts are the
same as that of the existing mark; 7) the potential relationship of the
goods or services that might occur in the minds of consumers because of
similarity of function; and 8) any other facts suggesting that the con-
suming public might expect the new team name to expand into the ex-
isting mark’s market.208
D.   Retaining Trademark Ownership of a Name No Longer in Use
If the Redskins change the team name, it will want to ensure that it
retains the exclusive right to use the mark in the future and the right to
bar others from using the mark. In Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro-
                                                                                                                                                
204. See  id.
205. See id.
206. Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir. 1983).
207. Harlem Wizards, 952 F. Supp. at 1098.
208. See, e.g. , Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 473-74 (3d
Cir. 1994); Dranoff-Perlstein Assoc. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 862-863 (3d Cir. 1992); Ford Motor
Co. v. Summit Motor Prod., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293 (3d Cir. 1991); Lapp , 721 F.2d at 463; Scott
Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978); Harlem Wizards, 952
F. Supp. at 1094.
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politan Baltimore Football Club,209 the Seventh Circuit held that a Cana-
dian Football League (CFL) expansion team’s name, Baltimore CFL
Colts, infringed on a mark owned by a National Football League
team—the Indianapolis Colts. In reaching its decision, the Seventh Cir-
cuit assessed the issue of trademark abandonment within the context of
professional sports teams.210
In 1952 the NFL Dallas Texans moved to Baltimore, and changed its
name to the Baltimore Colts.211 The Colts stayed in Baltimore for thirty-
two years, until 1984, when the team moved to Indianapolis, causing
great outrage and dismay to Baltimore fans.212 The Baltimore fans were
so upset that the City of Baltimore even tried unsuccessfully to prevent
the Colts from leaving through legal action.213 In 1993, one year before
the CFL gave its new team the name Baltimore CFL Colts, the NFL failed
to renew the federal registration for the mark Baltimore Colts, and the
new CFL team attempted to register the mark in its name with the
PTO.214 Two months later, the Indianapolis Colts filed a trademark in-
fringement suit in an Indiana federal court.215 The Indianapolis Colts
obtained a preliminary injunction that prevented the CFL team from
using the name “Colts,” “Baltimore Colts,” and “Baltimore CFL Colts.”216
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s injunction, holding that
the district court had not committed error in finding that the CFL team’s
use of the name Baltimore CFL Colts was likely to confuse a substantial
number of consumers.217
In Indianapolis Colts, the Seventh Circuit found that the Lanham Act
defines abandonment as non-use of a mark with intent to not resume
such use.218 The Lanham Act states:
A mark shall be deemed to be “abandoned” if either of the following
occurs:
(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such
use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Non-
use for three consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of aban-
donment. “Use” of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made
                                                                                                                                                
209. 34 F.3d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming preliminary injunction to the Indianapolis
Colts).
210. See  id . at 412-13.
211. See  id . at 411.
212. See  Jon Morgan, Hearing Ends, Ruling Due Monday in Suit over Use of CFL Colts
Name, BALTIMORE SUN, June 25, 1994, at C11.
213. The City of Baltimore unsuccessfully attempted to keep the Colts in Baltimore through
its power of eminent domain. See  Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 733
F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1984) (staying injunction against City of Baltimore), vacated and remanded
by Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 741 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
214.  See Dave Sottile, CFL Brings Colts Back to Baltimore: The NFL Denied the Handoff,
But the Canadian League Wants to Give the People What They Want, YORK DAILY REC., Mar. 2,
1994, at 1; see  also Ken Murray, Speros Calls the Play: CFL Team Sues the NFL, BALTIMORE
SUN, Mar. 3, 1994, at D8.
215. See  John R. O’Neill, NFL Colts Blitzing CFL Colts: NFL Joins Lawsuit Charging
Trademark of Name, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 30, 1994, at B1.
216. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, 34 F.3d 410, 411
(7th Cir. 1994).
217. See  id.  at 416.
218. See  id.  at 414.
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in the ordinary course of trade, and not merely to reserve a right in a
mark.
(2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omis-
sion as well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic
name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is
used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark.219
In Indianapolis Colts, the court ruled that when a trademark is aban-
doned it returns to the public domain and may be adopted by a new
user.220 However, the court found that in the right circumstances an
abandoned mark might well evoke a continuing association with the
prior use and user. 221 In such circumstances, the court stated, it is the
new user’s responsibility to take reasonable precautions to prevent con-
sumers from confusing the new mark with the old one.222 The court
found that since the previous user in these circumstances —the Indian-
apolis Colts—continued to market the same product—professional foot-
ball—under a similar name, a significant potential for confusion was still
present.223 The court further found that inserting “CFL” in “Baltimore
CFL Colts” was not a sufficiently reasonable precaution to prevent con-
sumers from confusing the new mark with the old one. 224 The Indian-
apolis Colts decision is encouraging for Pro Football. Even if Pro Foot-
ball chooses to rename the Redskins, under Indianapolis Colts, the con-
tinuing association with the new team name and the remaining goodwill
vested in the old name will likely preclude others from claiming the
mark has been abandoned and making unlicensed use of the mark.
                                                                                                                                                
219. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
220. See  Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 412.
221. See  id.  at 412-13.
222. See  id.
223. See  id.  at 413.
224. See  id.  at 412.
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The question of trademark abandonment in the context of a profes-
sional sports franchise was also recently addressed in Major League
Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Denarius, Ltd. , where the
Southern District of New York reached the opposite conclusion of the
Seventh Circuit. 225 In Sed Non, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument
that the defendant infringed upon its mark, “Dodgers.”226 The court
found that the plaintiff had abandoned the mark “Brooklyn Dodgers”
when the team moved to Los Angeles and changed its mark and its name
from the Brooklyn Dodgers to the Los Angeles Dodgers.227 The court
stated that the “Brooklyn Dodgers” was a non-transportable cultural in-
stitution separate from the plaintiff. 228 Because the plaintiff had aban-
doned the mark “Brooklyn Dodgers,” the court found that the defen-
dant’s use of the mark for the name of a restaurant was not a trademark
infringement.229
Unlike other forms of intellectual property law, trademark law gener-
ally rests on the principle that the owner must “use it or lose it.”230 The
fact that the PTO registers a trademark does not guarantee the mark in-
definite protection. For a trademark to retain protection it must be used
continuously in more than a de minimis manner. Use requires a mark to
be placed on goods, the packaging of goods, or displays associated with
the goods or services. 231 Absent continuous commercial use, a trademark
owner will be subject to claims of warehousing or abandoning the
mark.232 If the owner does continue to use the mark, the right of exclu-
sive use may continue indefinitely, and rights in the mark may be trans-
ferred from one party to another. However, trademark rights end and
protection terminates when the mark is abandoned or loses its distinc-
tive nature.233
                                                                                                                                                
225. See  817 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
226. See  id . at 1128.
227. See  id . at 1127-28.
228. See  id . at 1128.
229. See  id . As a result of the ruling in Sed Non, the trademark protection of other baseball
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231. See  Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th
Cir. 1986). Advertisement of goods, absent sale or shipment, may not qualify as “use.” See  In re
Ancha Elec., Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1318, 1320 (T.T.A.B. 1986); see  also  AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft,
Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1551 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that a trademark owner’s renewal of PTO reg-
istration is insufficient to rebut presumption of abandonment); In re Shipley Co., 230 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 691, 693-94 (T.T.A.B. 1986); In re International Paper Co., 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 424,
424-25 (T.T.A.B. 1967).
232. See  KANE , supra note 230, at 67.
233. See  2 MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 17.05.
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A primary defense to trademark infringement is that the owner of the
allegedly infringed mark has abandoned use of such mark.234 Once an
owner forfeits its right to a mark, the mark may be claimed and used by
the general public. The burden is on the defendant to show the mark has
been abandoned, and the court often requires clear and convincing evi-
dence of abandonment. 235 While non-use of a mark for three consecutive
years creates a prima facie presumption of abandonment, showing intent
to resume use in the reasonably foreseeable future can rebut such pre-
sumption.236 As one court stated, very appropriately for the Redskins’
circumstances, it is not the law that “the slightest cessation of use causes
a trade-mark [sic] to roll free, like a fumbled football, so that it may be
pounced upon by an alert opponent.”237 For a mark to be abandoned the
non-use must manifest an explicit intent by the mark’s owner to aban-
don it; mere suspension of use of the mark without the explicit intent to
abandon the mark is insufficient. 238 Furthermore, when a mark has re-
sidual goodwill, questions of abandonment should be resolved in favor of
the mark’s owner.239
Courts have identified uncontrolled mark licensing, the assignment of
the mark absent goodwill, and the mark’s transition into a generic term
as manifestations of abandonment, wherein the mark no longer serves as
a symbol of origin or quality.240
As highlighted by Indianapolis Colts and Sed Non, if Pro Football
does choose to rename the Redskins, it will need to take adequate pre-
cautions to retain whatever trademark rights remain in the Redskins
mark after the resolution of the appeal of the TTAB’s decision. Pro Foot-
ball should use the Redskins mark on goods, packaging or displays, or in
some other way make evident that it has not intentionally abandoned the
Redskins mark. 241 Furthermore, as indicated by the general case law re-
garding trademark abandonment and the Sed Non decision, Pro Football
should also take steps to ensure that the Redskins mark is not assigned
absent goodwill, and that the mark does not become generic.242
V.   CONCLUSION
The TTAB’s recent decision has charted new waters, and created a
precedent that could affect many potentially disparaging marks. The de-
cision also reflects how trademark law can be used as a powerful social
                                                                                                                                                
234. See  2 MCCARTHY, supra note 54, § 17.01[1].
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tool. Whether the Federal Circuit will affirm the decision remains to be
seen. Meanwhile, if Pro Football decides to rename the Redskins, either
as the result of registration cancellation or as an elective goodwill ges-
ture, Pro Football should choose a new team name that does not create a
likelihood of confusion, or reverse confusion, between the new name and
an existing mark. In avoiding a likelihood of confusion, particularly of
reverse confusion, the recent decision in Harlem Wizards  is a valuable
guidepost. One possible new team name that may preserve the goodwill
vested in the Redskins mark, and which would likely not be offensive to
Native Americans, is “Washington Reds.”
If Pro Football does choose to rename the Redskins, it will want to
ensure that it does not abandon whatever rights remain in the Redskins
mark. Guidance on avoiding trademark abandonment may be found in
trademark case law, including the decision in Indianapolis Colts.
The Redskins franchise is a storied team that has earned ongoing,
significant fan support as a result of good play and sportsmanship. The
TTAB’s decision will force Pro Football to make a tough decision re-
garding the Redskin team name; it also raises several interesting trade-
mark issues and provides an opportunity to add to the team’s proud leg-
acy.
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